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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although neither the Polish Government coalition nor the Solidarity-led opposition groups have decided yet how far they would support
privatization schemes, both alliances are in favor of equal treatment
of all sectors of the economy and accept the proposition that a meaningful market reform will entail substantial privatization.I Perhaps the
most surprising aspect of the present situation in Poland is that it is
unclear whose supporters, those of the Government coalition or those
of the Solidarity alliance, are more enthusiastic about privatization.2
However, recent public opinion polls indicate that public support for
privatization has been steadily growing during the last decade.3 Meanwhile, perhaps the most controversial aspect of the present debate is
how to transform the present, basically State-owned economy, into a
mixed-economy. The procedure of transformation requires the adoption of new legal solutions. Yet public attitudes toward law as an

*Professor of Law, A. Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland & University of Pennsylvania.
Doctor of Law 1965, A. Mickiewicz University; LL.M. 1973, Columbia University.
1. See, The Reports from the Round Table Negotiations, Zycie Gospodarcze, Apr. 16, 1989,
at 7 [hereinafter Round Table documents]; see also The Election Programof Solidarity, Tygodnik Powszechny, May 7, 1989, at 1.
2. The same is true about the leaders of the two coalitions. "At the economic table the
divisions ran almost as much within the two delegations as between them, with . . . social
democrats on both sides and neoliberals on both sides." Ash, Revolution: The Springtime of
Two Nations, N.Y. REV. OF Boos, June 15, 1989, at 3.
3. Compare Cf. Prof. M. Guzek's paper presented during this conference.
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instrument of change range from assumptions that its role will be
minimal in a market economy system to the proposition that privatization and the creation of a financial market can be achieved immediately by way of a super decree promulgated by a coalition government. These two extreme views are shared by some economists. 4
A more realistic proposition seems to be that the role of law will
be increased in the future and an in-depth knowledge of modern corporation law, commercial law, and securities law is a prerequisite for
successful implementation of the reform. Although the government's
power to directly control the economy will be drastically limited, its
involvement in business will remain. 5
This article focuses on legal aspects of the present privatization
schemes such as transformation of State-owned enterprises into mixed
companies with the participation of their employees and other shareholders. In addition, it discusses briefly other forms of indirect privatization or "genuine socialization ' 6 of State property, such as leasing
state enterprises by management or employees.
Structural aspects of privatization analyzed in this article include
relations between the management and the Employee Council (ECs),
the institutional control of the process of denationalization, and the
future role of foreign investors in the securities market.

II.

PROPOSALS CONCERNING DENATIONALIZATION SCHEMES

The great majority of Polish economists and lawyers agree that
privatization should entail a gradual process of transformation of Stateowned firms and cooperatives into private corporations, partnerships
and "genuine" cooperatives. Many authors favor various forms of
mixed-companies with participation of the State Treasury as a majority
or minority shareholder.
The barriers constraining the pace and scope of denationalization
schemes are financial, political, psychological and structural ones.

4.

Such a plan was proposed by Krawczyk, Skrypt do Kapitalu, PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY

No. 49 (1988). ContraSoltysinski, Uwlaszczyc emerytow, PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY No. 3 (1989);
Polaczek, Nieporozumienie, PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY No. 3 (1989).

5. "Virtually every major department of the typical corporation in the United States has
one or more counterpart in a government agency that controls or strongly influences its internal
decisionmaking." M. Weidenbau, Regulation: A Different Approach, 3 DIALOGUE 25 (1981).
6. The term "genuine socialization" (rzeczywiste uspolecznienie) is often used in Solidarity
documents. It usually denotes the process of transformation of a State-owned enterprise into
an employee share company, or a State-owned corporation co-managed by the employee council.
See The Election Program of Solidarity, supra note 1.
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First, according to various economic estimates, the total value of private investment capital in Poland represents between seven and ten
percent of the officially declared value of the State-owned assets.
Second, because of slightly different political considerations neither
the government nor the Solidarity alliance is likely to support an idea
of a radical and comprehensive privatization. Third, deep denationalization schemes do not enjoy enough support among various groups of
the Polish electorate such as unskilled labor, older employees, party
conservatives, partisans of the employees' participation in management
movement, and some trade-unionists, especially the so-called "neo"trade unions. Finally, a total denationalization could lead to massive
unemployment and bankruptcy of many firms which are now assigned
with special tasks either in the field of essential public services or
foreign trade, especially those involved in intra-COMECON (Council
on Mutual Economic Assistance) trade. Additionally, social security and
traditional sources of supply of basic raw materials could be suddenly
called into question.
Proposals advocating immediate and nearly total privatization
aimed at transforming State-owned enterprises, banks and even the
social security system into privately-owned corporations are also rejected by many neo-conservative and neo-liberal economists. 7 Radicals,
whether Jacobins or Bolsheviks, have much in common. They tend to
introduce their sweeping social experiments by way of uniform decrees
without paying attention to social costs. They try to "liberate" citizens
even against their will and do not pay attention to details or procedures.
Similarly, proposals calling for immediate and massive "enfranchisement" of employees of State-owned enterprises, beneficiaries of
the social security system, and owners of bank savings by way of a
legislative8 fiat not only disregard public attitudes and choices but are
inconsistent with free-market economy principles. Neither employees
of inefficient State enterprises nor owners of savings deposits would
be willing to become shareholders whereby they would be burdened
with liabilities of unprofitable companies or debt-ridden banks. A Denationalization Decree granting employees shares in their companies
"free-of-charge" would amount to a super-rationing scheme. Rationing
of food seems to be a simpler task than "just" apportionment of corporate shares among twelve million State employees along with mil-

7. Cf. Mozolowski, Kto kupi Nowa Hute, Polityka, May 13, 1989, at 4 (a report from
an economic seminar on privatization sponsored by The Catholic University, Lublin in 1989).
8. Such proposals are advocated by Krawczyk, supra note 4.
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lions of depositors and beneficiaries of the social security system. Also,
free "enfranchisement" at no cost to the employee-shareholder would
send a false signal to the emerging financial market. An opportunity
for lowering the State Treasury's deficit would be missed and so would
the chance of transforming the mentality of employees. Only an employee who invests and risks his own capital is likely to treat the
company as his own business. By contrast, many shareholder-donees
would dispose of their shares well below their fair market value.
Rampant speculation could bring about new crises and discredit "freemarket" policies. Finally, total and immediate denationalization is not
feasible because of organizational and structural considerations.
The relevant stipulations of the Round Table Agreement also relate
to socio-economic policies and structural reforms. All parties have
agreed that the new economic order should be based upon the principle
of "freely formed ownership structure." 9 It also has been agreed that
the Constitution should guarantee durability of pluralistic ownership
of the national economy and that the State agencies supervising public,
State-owned, companies should be substituted for one agency called
The Fund of National Assets.10 The management of the Fund is to be
appointed by the Parliament.
The Round Table Agreements provide that regulations concerning
denationalization should be promulgated by the Parliament. The documents contemplate the following patterns of direct or indirect denationalization: 1) sale of a State-owned enterprise; 2) sale of the
majority of shares of a State-owned enterprise to a private investor;
3) transformation of State-owned enterprises into employee stock-ownership corporations (ESOCs); and 4) leasing State-owned enterprises
to employees or other investors.
The existing system of joint-ventures with the participation of
foreign capital constitutes yet another form of denationalization. Assets
invested by a State-enterprise in such mixed companies are no longer
all national or State property.
The parties to the Round Table Agreements seem to support the
idea of ESOCs. They call for establishing a legal framework for transforming State-owned enterprises into companies owned by employees
and other persons. Additionally, the document stresses that conveyance of a State-owned company to a lessee in consideration of rent
should be preceded by competitive bidding."

9. Round Table Documents, supra note 1.
10. The Polish translation of the Fund of National Assets is Fundusz Majatku Narodowego.
11. The Polish translation of competitive bidding is Przetarg.
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It is clear that the signatories of the Round Table Agreements
opted for a gradual and partial privatization scheme subject to public
control. Stipulations on acquisition of State assets by private investors
assume that such transactions are subject to consideration. Free "enfranchisement" of employees is neither mentioned in the Agreements
nor in the Party or the Solidarity election programs.
While the political resolutions discussed above do not prejudge the
scope of privatization, there are statements suggesting that State
ownership will remain the dominant form of property. For example,
the employees' self-government is listed as the first principle of the
new economic order. The idea of joint-management and participation
on the scale contemplated by the text of the Round Table resolutions
is difficult to reconcile with the traditional private property approach.
The documents provide for granting unprecedented powers to ECs.
At the enterprise level these powers will include the board of directors'
appointment of top management, fixing its salary and the terms of its
employment contract, distributing after-tax profits of the company,
and approving in advance major business decisions such as long term
contracts and dispositions of certain types of assets.
Polish ECs combine broad powers of supervision over management
with the right of co-management in areas specified by statute. In
addition, the ECs are expected to obtain a statutory right to set up
an all-Poland Assembly of Employees Councils, an official lobbying
platform empowered to present its proposals and recommendations to
the Executive and the Parliament, as well as to all review legislative
proposals concerning economic policies and structural changes in the
national economy.
Since such a broad scheme of employee self-government has never
been implemented in any developed or semi-developed country, with
the possible exception of Yugoslavia, some economists and lawyers
have begun to voice objections. They argue that the Yugoslav experiment has largely failed. Furthermore, allowing employees to control
management and directly participate in operating their company does
not contribute to operational efficiency and long-term maximization of
profits. Managers free from government control may be muzzled by
local structures of ECs. Experience shows that members of an EC,
elected and responsible to their fellow employees, often act as tradeunionists or as political activists. Therefore, in many cases ECs cannot
objectively evaluate the employer's economic decisions. In the context
of the evolving new economic system, the idea of strengthening ECs
powers is becoming questionable even to those who supported it in
the past as an instrument of shielding a company's management against
the exercise of government control.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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Since ECs tend to act as employees' agents, the idea is not assessed
favorably by managers both in State-owned and private companies.
However, because only the private sector is independent enough to
voice its resistance, the Round Table documents state that future
legislation should establish employees' participation in private firms
with more than a hundred employees, while in joint-ventures with
foreign capital this scheme would be voluntary.
The future statutory powers of local ECs, and their national Assembly will directly influence the pace and scope of privatization. The
Round Table resolutions call for promulgating statutory guidelines
concerning sales of State enterprises and their assets to private investors. In the event of transformation of such an enterprise into a corporation or employee-share corporation, and in case of leasing to a
private lessee, the plan must be approved in advance by the proper
EC. The final and binding decision of the local EC shall be preceded
by a referendum among the employees and approved by the authorities
of the Fund of National Assets. However, the results of the referendum are not conclusive. An EC has the power to veto a plan of
privatization approved by their employees, the management, and the
Fund.
The partisans of the employee self-government approach also have
succeeded in obligating the signatories of the Round Table to agree
that ECs should have effective control over activities of those representatives of their enterprises who are appointed as directors and
officers in their controlled companies, totally or partially owned by
the parent State-owned enterprise. The resolutions further provide
that the bill should be elaborated with the participation of ECs representatives and presented to the Parliament before the .end of this
year. The sweeping language of that text implies that the proposed
regulatory scheme is aimed at giving ECs in State-owned enterprises
an effective, albeit indirect, control over management of all public
stock and close corporations.' 2 Thus, management of State enterprises
will be prevented from mitigating the burdens of the Statute on Employee Councils of 198113 by setting up subsidiaries in the form of
share corporations to which this law does not apply. The new law also
indirectly will affect joint-ventures with the participation of State enterprises and foreign capital.

12. For example, this would appear to be applicable to limited liability companies partially
or totally controlled by a parent State firm.
13. Ustawa z 25 wrzesnia 1981 o samorzadzie zalogi przedsiebiorstwa panstwowego 1981
Dziennik Ustaw [Dz. U.] No. 24, item 123.
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The consequences of such an idea are somewhat drastic. It would
mean, for instance, that an officer of a joint-venture formed by a
domestic State enterprise and a foreign corporation would be controlled
not only by the board of directors of the subsidiary and by the management of his former employer but also would be accountable to the
EC of the Polish partner even if the latter is a minority shareholder.
In a market economy system and in all company laws, a corporate
executive is an employee or agent of the owners of the business.
Although the basic understandings concerning the establishment
of legislative guidelines for disposition of State assets are timely and
sound, the agreed sales or lease of enterprises procedure seems to
give too much discretionary powers to ECs. That process should be
designed to ensure the best use and management of the public assets,
not to maximize the leverage of a particular EC. Even the interests
of the employees of the enterprise concerned should yield to the overriding public interest. Such conflicts of public and group interests come
into play when a proposed sale or lease would result in major lay-offs
or dissolution of a local EC. Therefore, the whole procedure should
be reversed. The employees ought to be consulted on a sale proposal
or lease of a State enterprise through a referendum or with their EC
and then decided by the Fund of National Assets. The decision could
be subject to judicial review to limit the discretion of the agency and
make its actions responsive to legislative guidelines. The EC concerned
should be able to challenge final administrative decisions concerning
the disposition of their enterprise, but the ultimate resolution of a
dispute whether a proposed sale or lease is in the public interest ought
to be deferred to an independent administrative agency established
by the Parliament subject to narrowly defined judicial review.
The present consensus among the signatories of the Round Table
negotiations requires unanimity among the Fund authorities, a prospective buyer of State assets, an EC concerned and, possibly, the
employees of a disposable enterprise. This unanimity combined with
the discretionary veto power of the EC resembles the infamous
LIBERUM VETO, the right of each member of the old Polish Diet
to reject its legislation against the will of the overwhelming majority.
For reasons of economic efficiency, fairness, and predictability, the
new Parliament should promulgate guidelines and procedures aimed
at striking a balance between conflicting interests of all persons and
groups affected by individual privatization decisions.
III.

THE EXPERIENCE AND LEGACY OF THE EXPERIMENTS IN
PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Two distinct but interrelated arguments are being advanced against
the first experiments in denationalization of State assets. First, conserPublished by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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vative elements in the Party argue that such decisions led to "selling
out" socialist principles. Furthermore, they maintain that privatization
schemes are illegal under the Constitution which provides for the
retention and strengthening of State ownership of basic means of
production. Second, many opposition experts, especially those associated with the EC movement, question the Executive's authority
to approve privatization transactions on legal and political grounds.
In their opinion, the present experiments are conducted without public
participation and legislative authority. 14 Indeed, neither the Law on
State Enterprises of 198115 nor any other statute gives the Executive
explicit authority to sell or lease a State enterprise. The government
relies upon a controversial Statute on Extraordinary Competencies
and Powers for the Council of Ministers in the Management of the
National Economy 16 and other extraordinary mandates which are due
to expire by the end of this year. This law gives the Executive the
authority to wind up State enterprises and introduce management
experiments.
The four privatization cases described below exemplify legal and
policy problems arising in this field. On December 31, 1988, the Prime
Minister signed a decision dissolving OMIG, a medium-size Stateowned enterprise, the way for the first major experiment in denationalization. Dissolution was necessary to experiment in leasing all
assets of OMIG to its managing director. The Prime Minister's decision
was preceded by a referendum held among OMIG's employees during
which 70 percent of the work force approved the director's plan. The
scheme was also supported by OMIG's EC. The council passed a resolution to terminate its own existence as an organ of the enterprise.
The long-term contract, whereby a limited liability company, incorporated by the former director, acquired interests in the assets of the
dissolved enterprise, can be characterized as a "contractus innominatus" having the combined characteristics of leases and loans.
OMIG's fixed and capital assets are subject to a usufructuary lease
whereas its remaining property, inventory, is borrowed by the lessee.
The latter is obliged to pay the lessor, the Treasury, a special dividend

14. See Bratkowski, Odnowa, Gazeta Bankowa, May 29, 1989.
15. 1987 Dz. U. No. 35, item 201. However, in 1989 an amendment was introduced which
provides that a State enterprise can be transformed into a share corporation at the request of
its management and its EC, supported by a majority of the company's crew. Finally, such a
motion shall be approved by the founding agency. 1989 Dz. U. No. 10, item 57.
16. 1988 Dz. U. No. 13, item 98. Art. 1(2) empowers the Council of Ministers to dissolve
a State-owned enterprise to improve the efficiency of the economy. These powers have been
prolonged and expanded by the Statute on Conditions of Consolidation of the National Economy
of Feb. 24, 1989, 1989 Dz. U. No. 10, item 57.
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which is 10 percent higher than that imposed upon State-enterprises.
Additional conditions attached to the conveyance include the lessee's
duty to produce goods ordered by the lessor. Only new equipment
acquired by the lessee is not subject to such a burden and can be
exploited freely by the owner.
Another denationalization plan was elaborated by the management
and employees of DANDYS, a medium-size textile enterprise from
Lodz. The proposal calls for leasing the assets of this municipal enterprise to a limited liability company owned exclusively by DANDYS'
employees. The EC and more than 85 percent of the work force approved the plan. However, the supervising organ, the President of
the City of Lodz, has not decided yet whether or not to accept the
offer. The reason for the delay is the existence of competing acquisition
offers of DANDYS by other State and private firms. The President of
the city indicates that the municipal authorities are inclined to accept
the highest bid, but the employees of DANDYS disagree. Their consent
for the denationalization of the enterprise was, they maintain, subject
to an implied condition that the assets of the dissolved enterprise
would be leased to their own, newly organized corporation.
The largest and the most controversial denationalization plan is
being implemented by the management and employees of IGLOOPOL,
an industrial and agricultural conglomerate. It is one of the largest
and the fastest growing Polish firms, employing 37,000 employees. As
in the cases of OMIG and DANDYS, the plan has the approval of the
employees and the EC. The promoters have already incorporated a
public stock corporation whose stated capital in the amount of
14,000,000,000 zlotys was divided into 280,000 shares with par value
of 50,000 zlotys each. All shares are restricted and can only be assigned
with the approval of the board. A salient characteristic of the plan is
that it distributes the subscribed stock among such different classes
of shareholders as a State enterprise, cooperatives, private firms,
employees, a trade union, a youth organization, and natural persons
not employed by the conglomerate. The stock of the employees of
IGLOOPOL represents about one-seventh of the original venture capital. The plan assumes that the State conglomerate will be dissolved
and its assets leased by the newly incorporated stock corporation. The
by-laws adopted by the promoters provide a few interesting rules.
For instance, political parties and trade unions shall not conduct their
activities during work hours. Political and sport organizations shall
not be subsidized by the corporation. 17 They can use the corporation's
premises and equipment only subject to monetary compensation.
17. The local sport club has acquired enough stock to live on future dividends. Ironically,
to justify the issuance of stock of a certain par value to the club, two interesting transactions
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A distinguishing feature of these and other denationalization plans
is that they are usually promoted by the management of profitable
firms. The employees' confidence in their managers' competence is a
key factor for the success of all privatization schemes.
These first experiments in denationalization have been both hailed
and condemned. Apart from criticism by the conservative socialist
ideologists, they are also criticized by the followers of the popular
employee self-government movement. Some critics argue that the experiments are aimed at "disarming" ECs and trade unions. The so-called managerial option is viewed as a disguised plan to endow members
of nomenklatura with property rights belonging to the State Treasury.
This vision, however, involves the danger of alienating or discriminating against many talented managers. Poland cannot afford to introduce
"reverse discrimination" based upon class or political considerations.
Such policies would restrain the pace of reforms and privatization. i 8
In the absence of denationalization guidelines and procedures,
privatization can be abused both by management and labor at the
expense of the rest of the society. 19 The most real danger is associated
with the existing imperfections of the pricing system and lack of an
established financial market. As a result, promoters of privatization
currently employed in profitable and lucrative State enterprises can

were made. First, the management, acting with the approval of its EC, donated their equipment
to their sportsmen. Then, that capital, a boxing ring, was invested in the newly incorporated
stock company as consideration for the issuance of stock. Compare Zuzelski, Igloogate, Gazeta
Bankowa, May 29, 1989, at 3, 13. Among the secondary promoters of the newly established
joint-stock corporation are also firms controlled by the Polish United Workers' Party and the
Association of Rural Youth.
18. T. Ash emphasizes that "enfranchisement" of nomenklatura also has advantages, namely:
"compensating some members of the nomenklatura for their loss of political power, and dividing
it between those who stand to lose and those who stand to gain" ("nomenklatura buy-out
theory"). Ash, supra, note 2.
19. To prevent such abuses, the Minister of Finances has recently sent an open letter to
his fellow ministers and founding organs of State enterprises, in which he outlines denationalization schemes. The letter calls for appraising assets of transformed enterprises in accordance
with their current market prices. It requires that paid-up stock should be offered for sale to
third parties by way of competitive bidding. Moreover, it suggests that a denationalization plan
may authorize employees to acquire bonus stock subsidized from designated assets of the dissolved enterprise. See Letter of the Minister of Finances (June 8, 1989), as published in Rzeczypospolita, June 8, 1989. The letter has no binding force and may be characterized as a commentary
to the controversial statutes on Conditions of Consolidation of the National Economy, see supra
note 13. The problem with the application of "current market prices" is that, in the absence of
a stock exchange and capital market, it is almost impossible to appraise the value of stock. One
also should distinguish between the value of the corporation as a going concern and the aggregate
value of its assets.
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divide the resources among themselves at a drastically discounted
price. They also can arbitrarily close access to their ventures for other
investors and offer bonus stock to powerful political allies in the Government, political parties, and trade unions. Poland's economic system,
being stripped of free-market pricing mechanisms, will not work any
better whether dominated by the followers of the management approach or the partisans of the employees' self-government camp.

IV.

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The transition to a new mixed-economy system will not be easy.
If the privatization process is to be approved by the people of Poland,
it must be conducted in a fair and efficient manner. Disposal of State
assets should be governed by legislative guidelines and supervised by
an independent agency rather than by ECs and employees having
vested interests in the outcome of privatization disputes.
Denationalization plans should be published well in advance of the
actual transition process, thus allowing ECs, local governments, and
other interested parties to challenge them in courts. But the scope of
judicial review should be narrow and simplified procedures ought to
be introduced to reduce the danger of costly delays.
The existing imperfections of the pricing mechanism, coupled with
the absence of the securities market, suggest that an accelerated program of disposal of State assets should be delayed until the price-control system is largely abolished and an effective stock exchange is
established. Only these two interrelated measures permit more objectively valued investment assets, shares, and economic performance of
newly incorporated companies.
Distribution of State assets among promoters of denationalization
plans, whether managers or employees, at discounted prices is detrimental to Poland. Nevertheless, in such a system, credit and tax
incentives for potential investors, particularly employees willing to
invest in their firms, should be introduced as an alternative.20
Because of the weaknesses of Poland's capital market and domestic
currency, detailed regulations regarding the scope of foreign participation in the acquisitions of key Polish industries are needed. For instance, foreign investments in domestic securities companies should

20. British and United States executive share option schemes serve as good examples how
to provide incentives to managers. As in the post-war British nationalized industries, Polish
managers in State-owned companies are drastically underpaid in comparison with their counterparts in the private sector.
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be restricted. On the other hand, the possible role of foreign experts
in devising the future securities exchange system ought to be considered.
Experience does not furnish much basis for altering the doubts
concerning the case for industrial democracy or employees' control.
The vision and competence of ECs are usually directed to advance
the interests of the constituency they represent rather than to promote
overall solutions for the national economy. But even if the idea of
joint management is rejected, structural changes designed to reduce
the corporate hierarchy of responsibility for decisions should be established. Such goals can be achieved by competent managers without
uniform legislative solutions.
During the transition to a "normal" economic system, Poland should
be skeptical about new and untested socio-economic ideas. At a time
of growing dependency on the world market, Poland has no choice
but to adjust its economic and legal structures to those prevailing in
free-market economy countries. The question is, can Poland resist the
temptation to experiment with a new utopian public philosophy which
promises to give the people of Poland the best of two worlds, the
socialist "discipline" at the work place and the capitalist abundance of
goods in supermarkets?
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